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ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyses the interest rate setting policy of the Swedish central bank, the 
Riksbank. In particular, the paper addresses whether or not the Riksbank reacts to 
deviations in asset prices from trend levels when setting interest rates. To investigate these 
issues a modified version of the Taylor rule is used, and is adjusted to reflect an appropriate 
inflation targeting horizon and augmented with terms accounting for the deviation of asset 
prices from their trend. Instrumental variables methods of estimation are used to 
determine which factors most affect interest rate setting, and it is found that forecasted 
inflation and interest rate smoothing are the significant explanatory variables.  Meanwhile, 
asset price inflation is not a significant determinant of the interest rate. This indicates that 
the Riksbank has not reacted to asset prices and that it is highly unlikely that the 
Riksbank any time soon will reverse its current expansionary policies and raise interest 
rates substantially enough to try to deal with potential bubbles or financial imbalances. 
The implication for the current policy debate is therefore that policy tools other than 
monetary policy need to be used to handle financial imbalances, and that other institutions 
than the Riksbank should act to implement these.  
Keywords: Monetary policy, Taylor rule, Sveriges Riksbank, Inflation, Asset prices 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the role of central banks has been thrust into the 
foreground of economic debate. Once deemed solely to be the quiet stewards of inflation, 
monetary policy activism after the crisis has raised interesting questions about whether 
central banks can and should do more to support growth and employment. Equally, charges 
that central banks were complacent in the run up to the financial crisis have led to calls 
that they should take greater responsibility for preventing future crises. These debates 
have challenged the traditional view of the primacy of numerical inflation targeting in 
monetary policy. Perhaps nowhere in the world are these debates being played out as 
intensely and transparently as in Sweden.  In an environment where potential dangers are 
manifold, such as negative interest rates, stock market inflation, household indebtedness 
among the highest in Europe, a possible real estate bubble and a housing market beset by 
structural problems, the Riksbank has been accused of creating the conditions for a new 
financial crisis by neglecting financial stability. But at the same time it has been criticised 
bitterly for having apparently “leaned against the wind” out of concerns for the financial 
system and damaged Sweden’s economic recovery. In order to understand how the 
Riksbank has actually behaved and gain a better understanding of how it can be expected 
to act in the near future, a study of whether or not the Riksbank has been reacting to asset 
prices is timely. Analysing the Riksbank’s behaviour is also especially appropriate since the 
bank is due to receive its third external evaluation by economists by the end of 2015. 
We begin by recounting the Riksbank’s performance during its years as an inflation 
targeter. In so doing we focus on the outcomes of independent external evaluations of 
Riksbank monetary policy commissioned by the Swedish Parliament, while also discussing 
current debates among Swedish economists about whether the Riksbank has done too much 
or too little to react to asset prices. Next, we explain the insights provided by economic 
theory about how many and which goals a central bank should have. We give an overview 
of the arguments for and against various policy regimes. The conclusions of previous 
studies for other central banks are also briefly summarised. We then account for the 
regression model we use to examine the Riksbank’s behaviour, which is an augmented 
forward looking Taylor rule estimated by IV methods. Finally, we present our results and 
conclude that deviations in asset prices have not had a significant impact on the conduct of 
monetary policy in Sweden. The implications for current policy are then discussed, and it is 
argued that given the Riksbank’s behaviour and current situation, macroprudential tools 
other than traditional monetary policy should be used to address potential risk to the 
financial system.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
 
Today, Sweden’s low inflation and recent experience of deflation have earned it the moniker 
of a “new Japan” from some commentators (Krugman 2014). However, Sweden’s transition 
to a low inflation economy is relatively recent. An inflation target for the Riksbank was first 
announced in 1993 and put into practice in 1995. Previously, exchange rate stability had 
been the goal of the Riksbank, together with supporting full employment and channelling 
investment towards strategic sectors, such as housing (Jonung 1993). The transition to an 
inflation goal and a floating exchange rate was part of a battery of reforms to Swedish 
stabilisation policy which arose out of the severe economic crisis Sweden suffered in the 
early 90s, but they also came after a decade of economic turbulence in the 1980s. Sweden’s 
economy was plagued by high inflation and the successive erosion of its competitiveness 
during these years, leading to cycles of devaluation where the Swedish krona was 
aggressively devalued against other currencies in ultimately short-lived attempts to restore 
competitiveness (Wetterberg 2009: 406). With the gradual establishment of formal 
independence for the Riksbank, enshrined in 1999, however, inflation in Sweden has 
followed the general trend downwards evident in other advanced economies with similar 
monetary policy regimes (Siklos 2002: 16). 
The Riksbank has defined its inflation goal as a target of two percent for the Consumer 
Price Index (Konsumentprisindex - KPI). An interval of +/- one percent applied formally 
until 2010, but the goal of two percent was still primary. The inflation target is also 
supposed to encompass support for the goals of economic growth and full employment. In 
addition to this mandate, the Riksbank has been tasked with maintaining a “secure and 
effective payments system”, which has come to take on the wider interpretation of working 
to help ensure financial stability in Sweden generally (Heikensten 2014: 28-9). While these 
goals at first glance may seem self-evident, criticism has emerged about whether the bank 
has neglected these goals, covertly followed others, requires more goals, or perhaps fewer, 
and also whether it has unduly taken on extra responsibilities or abdicated them. 
In particular, the question of sustained asset price inflation in Sweden, and whether the 
downward movement in interest rates since the mid-90s has exacerbated this, has often 
been a controversial topic in discussions of Riksbank’s monetary policy. As can be seen 
prima facie in figure 2.1, both stock and house prices have had a strong upward trend in 
Sweden for two decades while the Riksbank’s reporänta has successively fallen. The left 
axis refers to the short-term interest rate, and the right to the indexes of stock and house 
prices.  
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Figure 2.1: Interest Rates & Asset Price Inflation in Sweden 1995-2014 
 
 
 
Sources: Riksbanken, SCB, NASDAQ OMX 
While stock prices have seen large swings and corrections, notably in the early and late 
2000s, house prices have sustained a determined upward path. Galloping asset prices have 
been a forerunner to many financial crises, not least the latest in 2007-8 in many advanced 
economies. Prior to this, the relationship between the financial and real economies was less 
well understood, but now the potential for financial market havoc to bring deep and painful 
turmoil to the real economy has been thrown into sharp relief. Large asset price corrections 
can damage household finances and induce declines in consumption, while commercial 
banks are likely to react to declines in their own and their customers’ financial positions by 
tightening credit, with deleterious effects on business and investment. In the Swedish case, 
high levels of household indebtedness arguably strengthen the potential dangers of these 
mechanisms. All this begs the question whether a central bank like the Riksbank can, 
should, or has in the past attempted to, conduct monetary policy in a way which reacts to 
deviations of asset prices from perceived normal levels in the hopes of precluding any future 
crisis. 
 
Monetary Policy Evaluations 
The development of the Riksbank’s role in the post crisis Sweden of the late 90s and 21st 
century has not gone without public scrutiny. As noted above, its performance has received 
criticism from many quarters, but interestingly, it has also been the subject of two 
independent evaluations. As can be seen from figure 2.2, inflation has for the most part 
indeed been “low and moderate” in Sweden since the 90s, however, according to various 
measures, it has consistently lain under the stated goal of two percent. There has at times 
existed uncertainty over which measure of inflation the Riksank has preferred. But in 
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practice, the staff and decision-makers of the Riksbank weigh together a variety of 
measures of inflation and underlying inflation when making decisions. For a time a 
measure known as KPIX drew special attention given that it removed effects of interest 
rate changes on subsidies, mortgage payments and indirect taxes, which may have 
inflationary or deflationary consequences directly associated with monetary policy 
adjustments. In the late 2000s KPIX was phased out, having been found to consistently lie 
under KPI levels, and instead a measure known as KPIF where mortgage rates are held 
constant has recently received more attention (Hansson et al 2008: 24). Other methods 
include reducing the weighting of goods in branches where prices have displayed high 
volatility (Und24 and Trim85), or to harmonise measures with those used in other EU 
countries (HIKP). Notwithstanding the merits of the various measures, it is KPI for which 
the target of two percent exists and which receives the Riksbank’s primary attention 
(Wickman-Parak 2008: 1), and against which the Riksbank’s performance has most often 
been judged. 
 
Figure 2.2: Inflation in Sweden, various measures 1995-2014 
 
Several explanations have been put forward for the consistent outcome of inflation below 
the target, such as preference on the part of the Riksbank for inflation lower than two 
percent, poor forecasting, or the undue targeting of other variables such as asset prices 
(Svensson 2014a: 58). Elsewhere it has been explained that the Riksbank actually has no 
obligation to compensate for previous periods of “undershooting” and that the perceptions of 
failure on the part of the Riksbank because inflation has deviated from two percent are 
incorrect (Andersson & Jonung 2014: 38). It has also been stated that because interest rates 
have fallen and that these enter the KPI measure, inflation has tended to appear lower 
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than underlying measures would indicate (Ibid.: 39). Meanwhile, others have argued that 
the Riksbank has systematically overestimated inflation (Konjunkturinstitutet 2013a).   
In their independent evaluation of the Riksbank’s monetary policy for the period 1995-2005, 
Giavazzi & Mishkin call attention to what they regard as problems with the Riksbank’s 
communication in its increasingly flexible inflation targeting policy (Giavazzi & Mishkin 
2006: 69-70, 71). In particular, asset prices, specifically real estate, are singled out as areas 
where the Riksbank has not been clear in its communication. The authors cite the bank’s 
own motivations for interest rate decisions in 2006, concluding that these could “easily” be 
interpreted as having been based primarily on a reaction to movements in house prices, 
especially given that actual inflation was forecasted to be below two percent (Giavazzi & 
Mishkin 2006: 71-3). This, they point out, could give rise to confusion amongst the public 
regarding whether the Riksbank implicitly has given itself an additional target for asset 
prices over and above the inflation goal, and that this may have been interfering with its 
primary responsibilities (Ibid. 72). In their recommendations for improving the Riksbank’s 
conduct of monetary policy, they emphasise pointedly that the Riksbank’s mandate to 
ensure financial stability should not enter its flexible inflation targeting system through an 
independent concern for house prices. Instead, they argue that asset prices should only be 
reacted to if they are judged to be potentially contributing to overheating in the economy 
and to too high inflation (Ibid. 73, 77-8). 
A follow-up evaluation was conducted in 2011, focusing on the period 2005-10. This time 
the Riksbank was praised for its general transparency and for the quantity of information it 
produces. Nevertheless, concerns were expressed about the division of responsibility for the 
management of the financial system in Sweden and the lack of policy instruments available 
to the Riksbank other than “moral suasion” to carry out a broader interpretation of its 
financial stability mandate (Goodheart & Rochet 2011: 44-45). In addition, inflation was 
again concluded to have been lower than in comparable countries according to various 
measures, and it was suggested that the Riksbank’s policies could have been even more 
aggressive and expansionary than ultimately was the case (Ibid.: 60). 
How well the recommendations of the evaluations have been followed in subsequent years 
is debatable, however. Although full responsibility for macroprudential policy was finally 
given to the Swedish financial supervisory authority (Finansinspektionen) in 2013, it has 
continued to be argued that monetary policy has an important role to play as a tool of 
macroprudential regulation (Jansson 2014a: 57-8). Also, in practice, coordination between 
the Riksbank, the government and Finansinspektionen has at times been judged to be as 
poor.  
Regarding Giavazzi and Mishkin’s critique, while there are admissions that the connection 
between monetary policy, asset prices and the real economy are not well enough understood 
to substantially inform policy decisions (Ingves 2006: 8), the Riksbank has still expressed 
itself mercurially regarding how it treats asset prices in its deliberations. For example, 
when commenting on Giavazzi and Mishkin’s recommendations, Ingves (2006) has 
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suggested that decisions to increase interest rates could be hurried along to correct 
expectations of developments in house prices judged to be “unrealistic” (Ingves 2006: 4-5). 
Hence, whether the Riksbank’s flexible inflation targeting regime has broadened its focus 
and allowed asset prices an undue role alongside the primary goal of targeting KPI, and 
secondary concerns about output and employment, has remained an open question. 
 
Contemporary Criticism of the Riksbank 
In addition to the two official evaluations of its policies outlined above, the Riksbank’s 
performance has also become a subject of intense debate among Swedish economists. The 
consistent outcome of inflation levels lower than the stated goal of two percent has fuelled 
accusations that the Riksbank has deliberately pursued a strategy which has kept inflation 
from reaching the target, and undermined the wider goals of economic policy such as full 
employment (Svensson 2014a: 54).  
Probably the most vocal critic of this persuasion is Lars E.O. Svensson, a former vice-
director and member of the bank’s executive board. In a multitude of articles, speeches and 
columns, he has ignited debate about whether the Riksbank has caused damage to the 
Swedish economy by failing to pursue an appropriate monetary policy and by worrying too 
much about housing and indebtedness and raising interest rates too quickly as a result 
(Svensson 2014b: 104-5). Svensson has argued that nearly 40,000 jobs may have been lost 
because of this policy (Svensson 2013: 2), while contending that the Riksbank has 
historically interpreted its task of contributing to financial stability too broadly and has 
thereby wrongly taken it upon itself to pre-emptively combat financial imbalances better 
left to other institutions to handle (Svensson 2014a: 59). Svensson has, however, received 
criticism for these standpoints. On the one hand, it has been pointed out that his 
calculations regarding unemployment higher than the “necessary” level of equilibrium 
unemployment in Sweden rely on the assumption that inflation expectations are constant, 
when these in fact vary (Andersson & Jonung 2014: 40-1). On the other, his claim that the 
Riksbank has set interest rates with household indebtedness and house prices in mind has 
been described as presenting a history of Riksbank decision-making which is not in 
accordance with reality (Jansson 2014b: 2-3). 
At the other end of the spectrum has been the judgement that the Riksbank is abdicating 
responsibility to contain the threat of financial crisis in the future by lowering interest 
rates during a period of persistent asset price inflation. In doing so, it has been argued that 
the Riksbank is contributing to blowing a bubble economy of the very same sort which led 
to financial trouble in other countries (e.g. Jonung 2014). This discourse has recently gained 
traction, especially given that the planned introduction of mandatory mortgage repayment 
by Finansinspektionen has been postponed and that politicians and government have ruled 
out abolition of interest rate deductions (ränteavdrag) which are widely regarded as 
exacerbating fervent housing market activity. 
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In sum, the criticisms it faces make clear that the Riksbank has recently found itself caught 
between a rock and a hard place. Faced with an economy either experiencing outright 
deflation, or flirting with it, adherence to its inflation target would seemingly dictate 
further expansionary measures. However, in doing so the Riksbank leaves potential 
imbalances in the housing and financial sector unaddressed while as yet receiving little 
help from other institutions in dealing with these issues. This is a monetary policy dilemma 
if ever there was one. To analyse what the Riksbank, and central banks more generally, can 
reasonably be expected to do, or have done, we must turn to the prescriptions of economic 
theory. 
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III. THEORY & LITERATURE 
 
From the mid 1980s, the conduct of monetary policy by central banks gradually crystallised 
around the supremacy of numerical inflation targeting as the primary policy goal. The 
desire to press down and control inflation arose out of the economic turbulence of the 1970s 
when high inflation was seen as a culprit for the unsatisfactory performance of Western 
economies in these years. High and volatile inflation makes it difficult to plan economic 
activity, leads to higher borrowing costs, and distorts patterns of investment and 
consumption as well as having distributional effects on borrowers and savers (Freedman & 
Laxton 2009: 4-5). The implementation of inflation targeting has widely been regarded as a 
success by economists (Svensson 2010: 1242), with inflation expectations having become 
well anchored in most cases (e.g. Mishkin & Posen 1997: 89-90). 
Simply, inflation targeting involves the setting of a numerical goal for some measure of 
inflation, most often a two percent level for the consumer price index, as is the case for the 
Riksbank.  In practice, because monetary policy affects the economy with considerable lag, 
forecasts of inflation are used when making interest rate decisions to (hopefully) steer 
inflation towards its target The transparency of the two percent goal has come to be 
regarded as one of the merits of inflation targeting, as central bank decisions and objectives 
were often shrouded in secrecy during prior regimes. Furthermore, in tandem with 
enhanced central bank independence, inflation targeting has depoliticised monetary policy 
and increased the longer-term stability of its objectives. Finally, because inflation has a 
tight relationship with real economic variables such as output, this allows inflation-
targeting central banks to be “flexible targeters” and carry out short-term stabilisation 
policy which gives some weight to the output of the economy (Svensson 2010: 1239). This is 
something which has been succinctly and famously described by the Taylor rule which will 
be discussed later. Though just how flexible this flexible inflation targeting should be has 
long been controversial. 
 
How Many Goals? 
While the merits of inflation targeting are regarded as clear among most mainstream 
macroeconomists, there has been lively discussion about whether central banks ought to do 
more, or less. This is especially the case in light of the recent financial crisis which thrust 
monetary policymakers more into the limelight than before. Commonly advocated “third” 
goals include conducting macroprudential policy by using the interest rate or other 
instruments, or explicitly trying to ensure full employment. Advocates of extra goals meet 
resistance from those who maintain that monetary policy’s sole task should remain the 
objective of price stability and that adding extra objectives increases the risk of 
repoliticising monetary policy (Orphanides 2013: 2). 
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A popular argument for defending the idea that a central bank should only target inflation 
as a primary goal is to refer to Tinbergen’s rule. This rule states that if a policy maker 
wishes to achieve n goals, he or she must have n instruments at his or her disposal. The 
implication is that central banks in fact only have one true policy tool, the short-term 
interest rate, and that it is therefore foolish to try to do too many things at the one time. 
Indeed, central banks which have not been legally responsible for other goals have 
appeared to perform better in attaining their inflation targets (Siklos 2002: 13).  
This is not to suggest that central banks should completely neglect other concerns, but 
rather that these should enter into a “hierarchical” monetary policy as subordinate to, but 
linked with, the goals of inflation or price stability. Even as monetary policy is carried out 
with one main goal and one instrument, it does so in a manner of “constrained discretion” 
and with flexibility rather than rigidity (Bernanke & Mishkin 1997: 10). This means that 
while the central bank can respond to e.g. short-run traumas, the extent to which it does so 
is constrained by its adherence to the ultimate goal of price stability. Former Fed chairman 
Alan Greenspan tactfully expressed this idea by claiming that only growth associated with, 
and occurring in the context of, price stability should be maximised (Greenspan 2004: 37). 
This kind of hierarchy can be said to exist for the Riksbank, given that the task of 
supporting general economic policy goals (“den allmänna ekonomiska politiken”) is a 
function of its inflation goal and not a separate objective in and of itself. 
 
Reacting to Asset Prices 
Once thought to have little influence on the real economy, asset prices, and especially real 
estate prices, have shown themselves to have significant implications for the business cycle, 
not least in the wake of the 2007-8 financial crisis. This has prompted calls for central 
banks to better predict, manage and take action against asset price bubbles or anomalies 
which may imply risks for the real economy.  
An early sketch of how monetary policy affects asset prices, and in turn the real economy, is 
provided by Friedman and Schwarz (1963). With its purchases of securities the central 
bank increases the balance sheets of commercial banks and others, who then purchase their 
own securities, diversifying into equities and other instruments as prices increase 
(Friedman and Schwarz 1963: 60). The “diffusion” of the monetary stimulus from the 
financial to the real economy occurs as the price of financial assets rises so as to encourage 
the further diversification of portfolios into non-financial assets (Ibid.: 61-62). In the same 
way, monetary tightening encourages asset prices to fall, increasing the real rate of interest 
and leading to a switch from investment to saving (Alchian and Klein 1973: p. 179). The 
conditions through which asset price changes in the housing market influence the real 
economy have to do with the large role played by housing in the expenditure of much of the 
working population in advanced economies (Goodhart 2002: p. 350). Indeed, facilities 
through which households can borrow against the increased value of their homes to finance 
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higher consumption are widespread. As such, a significant correlation between the 
development of house prices and real output in the economy has been discernable (Ibid.: 
342). 
In spite of this, monetary policy doctrine for most of the inflation targeting period 
prescribed that central banks should not respond to asset prices or try to prick bubbles. The 
most influential view was presented by Bernanke & Gertler (1999), and it would go on to 
become orthodoxy. These authors wrote that asset prices should enter into monetary policy 
deliberations only in so far as they may contain information about actual future inflation 
and output. The central bank should not try to stabilise them at an equilibrium level, since 
this cannot be defined. Nor can a central bank with any degree of certainty predict if a 
movement in an asset price is reflective of economic fundamentals or not (Bernanke & 
Gertler 1999: 79). Elsewhere, the idea of reactive policy designed to control asset prices 
having a decisive role to play has been described as an “illusion”, and it has instead been 
argued that central banks should confine their actions to mopping up after the fallout of 
bubbles by implementing rate cuts (Greenspan 2004: 36).  
More recently, it has been proposed that central banks should have an explicit goal of 
reacting “systematically” to asset price developments over and above just adjusting interest 
rates to minimise deviations from target inflation (Cecchetti et al 2000). It is claimed that 
when asset prices can be observed to be deviating from “warranted levels”, monetary policy 
action should be taken through modest interest rate adjustments to try to pilot asset prices 
back to normal levels and hence offset any potential overspills from financial turbulence 
into output and inflation. It is also argued that such measures could perhaps even preclude 
the formation of bubbles entirely (Cecchetti et al 2002: 3). The case for “leaning against the 
wind” rests on a situation where disturbances in asset prices can be traced to underlying 
factors affecting the demand or supply of the asset, and on the perception that potentially 
volatile asset market developments which may have a sizeable effect on future inflation will 
be absent in traditional inflation forecasts (Ibid.: 4-5). Both of these scenarios would seem 
to apply to Sweden where, for example, the housing market remains regulated and highly 
inefficient, especially regarding housing supply, but also because increases in house prices 
have led to rises in household indebtedness. This potentially exposes home owners’ finances 
(and thus possibly their spending and saving decisions etc.) to distress should property 
prices fall (Konjunkturinstitutet 2013b: 38-9). 
The ideas put forth by Checchetti et al. have gained more traction in recent years, and have 
been echoed in other studies. As an example, it has been argued that had central banks 
paid more attention to real estate market misalignments and given them greater weight in 
their decision-making, the recent financial crisis may have been avoided or mitigated 
substantially (Cobham 2012: 26-7). Studies like these form part of a wider international 
critique of central bank policy more generally during the period known as the Great 
Moderation from the mid-1980s until the late 2000s. This period has commonly been 
regarded as one of unprecedented macroeconomic stability, presided over by deft monetary 
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policy conducted by adroit and increasingly independent central banks (Bernanke 2004). 
This interpretation is now being challenged because of the arguable role of central banks’ 
“complacent” monetary policy in failing to curb mounting imbalances, effectively supervise 
the financial system, or respond pre-emptively to developments which would later result in 
disaster. Examples of the complacent policies which have regularly been criticised include 
the “puts” of Fed chairs Greenspan and Bernanke whereby interest rates were cut in 
response to financial market turbulence. These actions have been derided as having 
fomented speculation and moral hazard (Miller etal. 2002). The verdicts reached by this 
literature are generally similar to the ideas earlier put forward by Checchetti et al. 
On the flip side, however, these events have also been interpreted as an example of why 
monetary policy is a poor instrument for pre-emptively or retroactively responding to 
financial imbalances. Looser monetary policy as an answer to stock market difficulties may 
risk causing overheating in the real economy, while interest rate hikes designed to stop 
speculation may worsen a prevailing downturn (a famous folly committed by the Federal 
Reserve in 1928-29), or constrict a fragile economic recovery as is now the case in several 
Western countries. The conclusion reached here is that to control the financial market, 
instruments other than traditional monetary policy must be used and developed and 
possibly be handled elsewhere than at the central bank, which should focus on the real 
economy and on its inflation or price stability mandate (e.g. Eichengreen 2015: 62). 
 
Other Objectives 
In addition to inflation and asset prices, other variables have also been proposed as targets 
for central banks. These include employment, nominal output, and exchange rates. 
Regarding the inevitable conflict between two or more of these goals with inflation 
targeting, it has been said that central banks should accept the existence of multiple 
objectives and the trade-offs associated with these and simply pursue the outcomes at the 
time regarded as most important (Cobham 2015: 2). 
Some economists have called for the replacement of inflation targeting with an explicit 
target for nominal GDP, or for employment, though these ideas have not broken through 
into mainstream monetary economics. Regarding GDP targeting, advocates contend that 
this would lead to a smoother business cycle and the avoidance of a classic dilemma where 
a positive supply shock, higher inflation and low output tend to produce contractionary 
monetary policies which worsen recessions. It has also been argued that communicating 
about monetary policy in a way that focuses on GDP instead of inflation will lead to less 
confusion among members of the public who react negatively to calls for “higher inflation” 
when increased aggregate demand is the intended consequence of stimulus (Sumner 2011: 
15). Meanwhile, the case for an employment target is made chiefly on the grounds that by 
targeting inflation, central banks have neglected growth and employment creation. In 
response, a more “socially conscious” monetary policy is favoured, similar to the 
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developmental role it is surmised central banks played in, for example, Europe during the 
Golden Age of Economic Growth after the Second World War (Epstein 2007: 14-15). 
However, when it comes to the business cycle it has been found that the presence of explicit 
quantitative targets for variables like inflation and money growth are significantly 
associated with smoother business cycles (Fatás et al 2006: 30-1). Moreover, when turning 
to the role of monetary policy and employment, it is a widely held viewpoint that labour 
market institutions and structural variables are by far the most important determinants of 
unemployment, and that while e.g. expansionary monetary policies can mitigate the 
employment costs of downturns, they cannot be expected to create higher employment for 
extended periods by themselves (Orphanides 2013: 5). Furthermore, by instead focusing 
primarily on inflation and creating a climate of stable expectations, it is arguable that 
monetary policy contributes to an environment more conducive to higher employment 
already, without the need to vigorously react to labour market developments as an 
independent policy goal. 
A final proposition is that the central banks of small open economies may wish to engage in 
some form of exchange rate targeting (Ball 1999: 142). The reasons why a central bank 
might wish to target exchange rates are many. These may include assisting economic 
expansion through depreciating a currency to support exports and competitiveness in the 
short-term (even though this is frowned upon), or equally to strengthen the exchange rate 
against another currency. An exchange rate target may also complement inflation targeting 
if it, for example, implies that a central bank should aim for below target inflation if 
depreciation is forecasted to occur (Ibid.). On the other hand, however, exchange rate 
targeting has been claimed to lead to sub-optimal outcomes by increasing the volatility of 
inflation and by also failing to reduce exchange rate volatility in a meaningful way (Batini 
& Nielson 2000: 36).  
 
Interest Rate Smoothing, Credibility & Financial Stability 
Beyond the actual targeting of various economic variables, detection of the behaviour of 
interest rate smoothing has also become a standard outcome when macroeconomists have 
modelled monetary policy. With interest rate smoothing is meant the gradual adjustment of 
short term interest rates in incremental steps with infrequent changes in direction and the 
eschewing of large and volatile increases or decreases (Sack & Wieland 1999: 2). Interest 
rate smoothing is a phenomenon present in most advanced countries (Goodhart 1998: 13). 
This has led to some arguments that central banks have it as an unspoken goal to smooth 
interest rates (Woodford 2002: 1), and even criticisms that smoothing essentially inhibits 
central banks from responding to macroeconomic developments in a timely fashion 
(Rudebusch 2006: 86-7). This is particularly because smoothing parameters sometimes 
return very high and significant values in Taylor rule regressions, and can imply very 
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sluggish adjustments by central banks towards their targeted interest rate (Welz & 
Österholm 2005: 2).  
The notion that interest rate smoothing and the slow adjustment it implies leads to 
suboptimal outcomes for inflation and output has, however, been rejected in favour of the 
argument that smoothing is in fact an optimal policy choice. Given that forward-looking 
central banks inevitably make errors in their forecasts, it is arguable that slighter 
adjustments based on these predictions are preferable, since a large forecast error may end 
up implying a highly unsuitable policy rate if non-smooth adjustments had been made 
(Sack & Wieland 1999: 31). It has also been argued that because the economic impulses and 
uncertainty originating from monetary policy decisions are greatest when rates do move in 
another direction, avoiding frequent reversals is sensible (BIS 1998: 68-9). The argument is 
further strengthened when one considers that modern inflation-targeting regimes and 
independent central banks owe much of their success to their establishment of credibility. 
In this context, an environment where small adjustments in interest rates are expected to 
persist is likely to be viewed as more credible by forward-looking private actors, who, if 
confronted with fickle monetary policy characterised by large swings, would lose confidence 
in the central bank (Crow 2001: 2). Indeed, this latter point about the importance of 
credibility is especially pertinent for the Swedish experience, where the Riksbank’s 
inflation targeting regime has led to stable expectations and long-duration contracts among 
employers and employees (Fregert & Jonung 2008: 19). This is a fact which would arguably 
have been less the case had monetary policy moved in large steps or jumped in different 
directions in a volatile manner if interest rates had not moved smoothly.  
A final and important explanation put forward for interest rate smoothing is that it 
contributes to financial stability. Short-term interest rates set by central banks affect a 
variety of other interest rates of importance to commercial banks and other financial 
institutions. Large swings in monetary policy would therefore have a disorderly impact on 
financial markets and cause “undue stress” (Rubebusch 1995: 272). Additionally, volatile 
short-term interest rates could lead to sizable swings in flows of payments between 
corporations and financial intermediaries (Crow 2001: 2). 
Interestingly, however, although the objectives of financial stability are generally agreed to 
lie at the heart of interest rate smoothing, it may have the unintended consequence of 
actually promoting other forms of instability. This might occur if smooth interest rates are 
interpreted as a “buffer” by banks, who may then choose to engage in higher lending in 
riskier assets (Smith & Van Egerten 2004: 164, 167) and dilute their abilities to absorb 
interest rate fluctuations (Driffill et al 2006: 106). In circumstances where a smoothing 
policy is in place, it may therefore be incumbent upon other institutions than the central 
bank to account for macroprudential regulations, and to make these tighter (Smith & Van 
Egerten 2004: 20-1). 
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Previous Studies of Central Banks and Asset Prices 
There have been several prior empirical studies of whether central banks have reacted to 
asset prices or not. Most of these papers have involved adding terms for asset prices to 
Taylor rule regressions. This forms part of the wider Taylor rule literature where monetary 
policy equations are estimated with instrumental variable (IV) methods such as the 
Generalised Method of Moments, Two Stage Least Squares, and Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood. The focus of asset price studies has most often been limited to the 
larger central banks: the Federal Reserve, the ECB and the Bank of England. The results of 
these studies have been inconclusive, even when the same central bank has been analysed. 
For example, the ECB has been found not to directly react to asset prices but rather use 
these in inflation forecasting in a fashion akin to that proposed by Bernanke & Gertler 
(Siklos et al 2004), while another study finds that stock price movements influenced the 
ECB’s policies even before the recent financial crisis (Botzen & Marey: 2010). Elsewhere, a 
study of the behaviour of the Bank of England has found the bank to account for asset price 
inflation, and the property market in particular (Kantonikas & Montagnoli 2004), and an 
IMF staff paper has also argued that US, UK and Japanese central banks set interest rates 
to offset deviations in asset prices and exchange rates from equilibrium levels (Chadha et 
al. 2004). However, this was only for a later study to conclude that similar regressions 
produce disperse and bias results for both the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of Japan (Finocchiaro & Von Heideken 2012).  
So, it is clear there is no generally agreed upon answer as to how central banks have 
actually behaved and how they have reacted to asset prices. Studies of the above type have 
not been carried out for the Riksbank, but given the current debate about the Riksbank’s 
apparent neglect of its policy goals and prioritisation of asset prices, it appears that it is 
timely to do so. We must first, however, set out an appropriate method. 
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IV. DATA & METHOD 
 
The foremost method used for analysing the monetary policy of inflation-targeting regimes 
in the standard macroeconomics literature is the Taylor rule, set out by Taylor (1993). The 
Taylor rule proposes that the interest rate set by the central bank will be a function of the 
deviation of the actual inflation rate from its target rate, i.e. the target which the central 
bank has either set or is mandated to achieve, and the output gap, measuring the deviation 
of GDP from its potential level. A standard Taylor rule is thus given by: 
 
            
       
   
    (4.1) 
 
Where   is the short term interest rate set by the central bank,   is the intercept,   is 
actual inflation and    the inflation target, and   the output gap. Finally,   is an error 
term, which as we will see cannot yet be assumed to be i.i.d..  
Although Taylor’s initial work fitted the data for the United States, for the rule to achieve 
explanatory power for other cases its specification usually has to be modified, and 
augmented with additional terms (Fernandez & Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy 2006: 3). Most 
commonly, Taylor rules have been augmented with a lagged value of the interest rate. As 
we have seen, the literature argues that this is supposed to account for the phenomenon of 
interest rate smoothing whereby central banks refrain from large increases or decreases in 
the interest rate, preferring to make small adjustments to the previous rate out of concerns 
for financial stability (DiGiorgio & Rotondi 2011: 6). This allows for the previous period’s 
interest rates to play a role in the determination of the current rate. The Taylor rule now 
becomes: 
 
                                     
       
   
          (4.2) 
 
With      as the lagged interest rate and   is the smoothing parameter, while the   
coefficients indicate the short-run effects of the output gap and the deviation from target 
inflation on the interest rate.  
Estimating equation 4.2 for the Riksbank reveals that the error terms are serially 
correlated. The presence of a lagged dependent variable and serial autocorrelation means 
that OLS is inconsistent, but surprisingly this has been ignored by a number of Taylor rule 
studies (Welz & Österholm 2005: 5). We do not ignore this issue here and instead, we 
attempt to remove the serial correlation by following the practice of using additional lags of 
the dependent variable until the autocorrelation is removed (Kennedy 2003: 144). Adding 
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one additional lag of the interest rate is found to be sufficient to eliminate the 
autocorrelation of the residuals at all lags, according to a Breusch-Godfrey LM test.  
A further problem with running regression 4.2 is the suspicion that the series for the 
Rikbank’s short-term interest rate contains a unit root. As suspected, unit root tests on this 
series fail to reject the presence of a unit root. To address this issue, we replace the short 
term interest rate with its change from the previous period. Hence, we arrive at: 
 
                            
       
   
                    (4.3) 
 
A Forward-looking Inflation-targeting Taylor Rule 
Although equation 4.3 can be estimated, it would not be a good model of how central banks 
behave when they set the interest rate. Monetary policy does not instantaneously affect the 
economy and a change in the current interest rate will not automatically restore inflation 
towards its target level. Rather, just as with other economic policy tools, monetary policy 
operates within the context of significant “outside lags” where the full impact of a policy 
change will not be felt on the economy until several periods later (Svensson 1997: 1113). 
This would suggest that the deviation of inflation from the target in the current period,  , 
would not be a suitable variable to be included in the policy rule, and that it would instead 
be more realistic to include expectations of inflation      for some n future period (Batini & 
Haldane 1999: 158). The Riksbank policy is based on targeting inflation occurring in one or 
two years in the future (Berg et al 2004: 4), and we therefore choose to set period for the 
expected inflation four quarters ahead as the variable of most interest to the Riksbank, and 
as the horizon most feasible to include. Taking the route proposed by Clarida et al (1998) in 
an influential article on forward looking Taylor rules, we can write a forward looking rule 
in the following way: 
 
                        
             
                           (4.4) 
 
Where    is the information set available to the central bank at time t, and where the 
expectation expressions          
       and     
        denote the expected deviation 
of inflation from its target four periods ahead and the expected deviation of GDP from its 
potential level. Both of these are conditional on the information available to the central 
bank in the information set and this reflects the resources available to the Riksbank when 
it carries out forecasting. The current output gap is conditional on the information set 
because the output gap is a variable which is not contemporaneously observed by 
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policymakers and which has to be estimated. It is also the case that GDP statistics are 
published with a sizeable lag. We have here followed the specification often recommended 
in the literature (e.g. McCallum 1993, Berg etal 2004: 8, Clarida et al 1998: 1037).  
In order to transform 4.4 into an estimable equation, we express inflation and output as 
their realised values and thus remove the expectation/forecast terms… 
 
                    
       
   
                    (4.5) 
 
… and define the error term as a linear combination of the errors in forecasting the 
inflation and output gaps, together with an i.i.d. disturbance term,   . This yields: 
 
                                                    
   
     
            (4.6) 
 
Having arrived at the specification detailed in 4.5, we can quickly surmise that this 
regression will likely suffer from simultanaeity and endogeneity problems which would 
render OLS estimation inconsistent. This is because of the outside lag of monetary policy 
which we have previously identified, so adjustments in the short term interest rate today 
will affect the level of inflation in the future, and thus its deviation from its target The 
estimated output gap for the current period will of course also depend on the interest rate. 
In order to amend these problems, estimation with instrumental variables (IV) should be 
attempted. For this we need instruments which are not correlated with the error term and 
which are correlated with the endogenous regressors. Most commonly, the literature 
proposes using lags of the inflation and output gaps (Clarida et al 2000: 156-7) and we also 
do so here, while additionally using an index for commodity prices also suggested by 
Clarida et al (1998, 2000). In our case this data is taken from the World Bank. We use four 
lags of the inflation and output gaps and the current value of the commodity prices in 
addition to four lags. Our reasoning is that past values for inflation and GDP gaps will be 
indicators of future and current movements in these variables while not being correlated 
with the error term of an expression explaining changes in the current interest rate. This is 
given that the previous values belong to the past and are already realised. Similarly, 
commodity prices can be expected to be correlated with inflation given that e.g. oil is an 
essential input, but they are certainly independent of the interest rate set by the Riksbank. 
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Accounting for Asset Prices 
We follow the implications of Bernanke & Gertler (1999) and Cecchetti et al (2002: 3) and 
model the central bank’s behaviour towards asset prices as a reaction to changes in asset 
prices in the previous period. This is because responses to asset prices should either be 
determined by whether or not these variables give an indication about coming levels of 
output and inflation (Bernanke & Gertler 1999: 115), or as an explicit monetary policy 
response to prices moving away from the “warranted levels” (Cecchetti et al 2002: 3). This is 
a reasonable specification as central bankers possess no outright forward-looking target for 
asset prices, while they are legally obligated to set interest rates in a manner which should 
aim for the target rate of inflation to be achieved. However, this does not, of course, mean 
that asset price developments are ignored entirely despite the lack of an explicit target, and 
as Ingves (2007: 5) explains for the case of the Riksbank, “… we do not target house prices, 
but we do not ignore the risks associated with them.” Additionally, it is generally regarded 
as extremely difficult to predict future asset price movements or discern the presence of 
financial bubbles, and what information is available can seldom confirm whether changes 
in asset prices reflect movements in fundamental factors or not. By specifying in this way 
we are also able to account for the ideas advanced by Cecchetti et al where previously 
observed deviations in the prices of assets should induce changes in interest rates, while 
their future values remain untargeted. 
Sweden is a small open economy, and it has regularly been argued that for such economies 
an exchange rate term should also be added to the Taylor rule specification (e.g. Bask 2006, 
Chadha et al 2003). An example would be the deviation of the real exchange rate from its 
equilibrium level, however, there are significant problems with calculating equilibrium 
levels for the real exchange rate (Baffes et al 1997), a variable which is furthermore not 
observed and where changes are difficult to distinguish from nominal exchange rate 
movements (Sawyer & Sprinkle 2015: 337). Other studies have instead included a term for 
the exchange rate between the national currency and another, more dominant currency 
(e.g. Claida et al 1998: 1055). For Sweden, the obvious choice here would be the Euro, and 
prior to its inception the D-mark. This is due to the tight integration of the Swedish 
business cycle with the German and European ones (Bergman 2008: 57-8), and Sweden’s 
dependence on exports to the European market Given that successive bouts of inflation and 
erosions of competitiveness plagued Sweden prior to the establishment of an inflation-
targeting regime for the Riksbank, it is conceivable that the Riksbank pays special 
attention to the SEK/EUR exchange rate. Indeed, perhaps because of this the SEK/EUR 
exchange rate has been largely stable since the mid-90s, as can be seen in figure 4.1. In 
light of this stability, we can expect that the Riksbank may wish to keep the SEK within a 
certain “band” in its relationship to the euro, even although this is not an explicit target As 
such, we use the percentage deviations of the SEK/EUR exchange rate from its average 
level for the period as an exchange rate term. 
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Figure 4.1: SEK/EUR Nominal Exchange Rate 1995-2014 
 
 
By adding these three terms to the specification in 4.5, we obtain an augmented version of 
the modified Taylor rule: 
 
 
               
       
   
                                           
                         
                                                                                                                                (4.7) 
 
Here,        and         denote the lagged percentage deviations of asset prices and 
house prices from their trend levels respectively, while        is the lagged percentage 
deviation of the SEK/EUR exchange rate from its average value for the period. Regarding 
instruments for these variables, these are not required since the observed deviations of the 
asset prices from their trend levels in the previous period and the deviation of the 
SEK/EUR exchange rate from its average from the previous period will not be correlated 
with the error term for the change in the interest rate in the current period,   .1 Hence, 
these variables will function as their own instruments. The same applies to the two lagged 
values for the change in the interest rate. 
The data used for the variables is obtained from quarterly data for Sweden from 1995Q1 to 
2014Q4. The measure used for the short-term interest rate is the Riksbank’s reporänta, 
which is the interest rate commercial banks face when borrowing from the Riksbank for a 
period of seven days and the short-term rate which the Riksbank uses to adjust monetary 
policy. The inflation target is two percent, while the deviations of inflation are calculated 
from the consumer price index minus the target rate. GDP data for the output gap are 
taken from the OECD and the output gap is approximated by an HP filter. Data for house 
                                                          
1
 i.e.                     ,                      ,                      
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prices come from Statistiska Centralbyrån’s Fastighetsprisindex while asset prices are from 
the OMX Stockholm All-share index. The trend levels of these series are also calculated 
from HP filtering as suggested by Siklos et al. (2004: 12) and the percentage deviations 
from these trend levels are obtained. The SEK/EUR exchange rate data is from the 
Riksbank. Regarding the HP filters, the value of λ is set at 4800 for quarterly data, and we 
also drop the first and last observations in the series to reduce the risk of imprecise trend 
estimates at the start and end of the sample in accordance with standard practice 
(Sörensen et al 2005: 425) (the dropped observations are from 2015 and 1994). The data for 
the interest rate, inflation, asset prices and the SEK/EUR exchange rate were aggregated 
from monthly to quarterly using 3 month averages. The regression in 4.7 is initially 
estimated using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with HAC standard errors and the 
aforementioned instruments. 
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V. RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 
Table 5.1 reports the results from the initial 2SLS regressions using the modified Taylor 
rule set out above. From these results we can deduce that the deviations of stock and house 
prices from their trend values do not have a meaningful impact on changes in the interest 
rate, as none of the asset price variables are significant. On the other hand, the Riksbank 
 
Table 5.1: 2SLS Regression Results 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
 
  
 
2SLS 
Estimates 
 
 
S.E.s 
 
       inflation gap 
  
0.22**  
[0.005] 
 
0.06 
 
       output gap 
  
0.04  
[0.568] 
 
0.07 
 
       asset prices 
 
 
 
0.001 
[0.840] 
 
0.003 
 
       house prices 
  
–0.05 
[0.068] 
 
0.03 
 
       SEK/EUR 
  
0.002  
[0.850] 
 
0.19 
 
        
  
0.72**  
[0.000] 
 
0.15 
 
        
  
–0.26*  
[0.033] 
 
0.12 
 
T 
  
77 
 
 
 
   
 
  
0.59 
 
 
    
(i) p-values are given in parentheses 
(ii) * Indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
(iii) ** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
(iv) Instruments:         
 ,       
   
,           ,       ,        ,        ,      ,        
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does react to inflation and a one percentage point increase in the expected deviation of 
inflation from its target rate is associated with a short-run change in the interest rate of 
+0.22 percentage points. Additionally, we receive no significant result for the measure of 
the output gap, and this is similar to results from some other studies of inflation-targeting 
central banks (e.g. for the Riksbank: Berg et al 2004: 28). This is also the case when we look 
at the first coefficient for interest rate smoothing, which is indicative of the presence of 
smoothing and of policy “gradualism”, something which is commonly found in other studies 
(e.g. Castelnuovo 2003: 8-9), and confirms the likely preference of central banks like the 
Riksbank to only make incremental changes to their policy rates.  
 
Instrument Diagnostics 
Having estimated the 2SLS equation, we can now determine if this was indeed the right 
choice of estimator by running a series of tests. The first test we run is to determine 
whether or not the regressors of the inflation gap and the output gap are in fact 
endogenous. To do this, we conduct a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test with the null hypothesis 
that the suspect regressors are exogenous to the model. As can be seen in table 5.2, we 
clearly reject this null and confirm that the inflation and output gaps are endogenous. The 
next important test to be carried out is the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions where 
the null hypothesis is that the instruments chosen are uncorrelated with the error term. 
For this test we are unable to reject the null hypothesis and conclude therefore that the 
instruments are valid and that the 2SLS estimation is thereby consistent. 
 
Table 5.2: Instrument Diagnostics 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regressor 
endogeneity test 
  
   = Regressors 
are exogenous 
 
 
 
 
Sargan Test 
 
   = Instruments 
uncorrelated with     
 
Durbin score 
 
11.66 
 
Sargan score 
 
4.032 
 
p-value 
 
0.003 
 
p-value 
 
0.402 
    
 
However, when we check for the weakness of our instruments, we unfortunately detect 
considerable weakness. The 2SLS estimator is therefore not unbiased, with Stock-Yogo 
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tests in table 5.3 indicating that we are unable to reject null hypotheses of “size distortions” 
where the true significance level of hypotheses tested may be much lower than five percent. 
We have thus run into a weak instruments problem where despite instrument validity and 
the inconsistency of OLS having been confirmed, our results may still suffer from large 
bias. This means that we cannot trust only the 2SLS estimates. This is a recurring problem 
in the estimation of macroeconomic and time series models where there are few 
observations, and it is common for the 2SLS estimators to perform poorly in small samples 
(Woolridge 2013: 521-2). The problem is amplified when there are many instruments 
relative to the number of endogenous regressors (Bun & Windmeijer 2010: 2). 
In order to deal with these problems we rerun the regression using Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimation, which is a linear combination of OLS and 2SLS 
estimators and has better small sample properties than 2SLS (Hausman 1983, Imbens 
2010: 2). Additionally, we drop later lags of the instrumental variables which are less likely 
to be correlated with the endogenous variables. We can thus see how the results are 
affected and compare how well the estimates now perform to judge if there is any 
improvement. 
 
Table 5.3: Instrument Diagnostics 2: Instrument quality in 2SLS & LILM 
 
 
2SLS 
  
Cragg-Donald F-Stat = 4.71 
 
LILM 
 
Cragg-Donald F-Stat = 3.98 
 
Size significance(i) 
 
10% 
 
21.68 
 
Size significance 
 
10% 
 
3.90 
 15% 12.33  15% 2.83 
 20% 09.10  20% 2.52 
 25% 07.42  25% 2.35 
  0    
 
(i)    = True significance level of hypothesis tests is below x% when the estimate level is 5% 
 
As can be seen from table 5.3 above, the use of LILM improves the performance of the 
instrumental variables estimation and performs considerably better regarding size 
distortions of the significance of tests conducted on the regression coefficients. Indeed, from 
the Cragg-Donald statistics we can even reject the null hypothesis that the true level of 
significance in hypothesis testing is below ten percent when nominally five percent. As 
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such, it appears the small sample bias of the 2SLS estimator has been eliminated. The 
results of the re-estimation of equation 4.7 using LIML are given below: 
 
Table 5.4: LIML Regression Results 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
 
  
 
LIML 
Estimates 
 
 
S.E.s 
 
       inflation gap 
  
0.36**  
[0.000] 
 
0.09 
 
       output gap 
  
–0.03  
[0.660] 
 
0.07 
 
       asset prices 
 
 
 
0.001 
[0.810] 
 
0.004 
 
       house prices 
  
–0.07* 
[0.020] 
 
0.03 
 
       SEK/EUR 
  
–0.01  
[0.411] 
 
0.19 
 
        
  
0.74**  
[0.000] 
 
0.14 
 
        
  
–0.15  
[0.338] 
 
0.15 
 
T 
  
77 
 
 
 
   
 
  
0.43 
 
 
    
(i) p-values are given in parentheses 
(ii) * Indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
(iii) ** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
(iv) Instruments:         
 ,       
   
,           ,       ,        ,        ,      ,        
 
The results of the LILM estimates largely confirm those attained from 2SLS estimation, 
though this time without the possible considerable bias. The short-run response to 
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deviations of expected inflation from the target rate induce a stronger short-run response 
on the interest rate this time around, with a one percentage point deviation producing a 
change in the interest rate of 0.36 percentage points. Importantly, we obtain a small 
negative, yet statistically significant value for the deviation of house prices from trend 
levels. This manifestly rejects any notion that the Riksbank has reacted to an increased gap 
between actual house prices and trend levels (i.e. accelerating increases in house prices) by 
increasing the interest rate in attempt to cool the housing market. Rather, we can deduce 
that the reverse is likely to be true and that reductions in the interest rate have probably 
helped fuel house price inflation. We once again find no significant relationship between 
interest rate setting and stock prices or the SEK/EUR exchange rate, while the degree of 
“policy inertia” or preference for interest rate smoothing as denoted by the lagged changes 
in the interest rate is of similar size to our 2SLS estimations. We can finally add, that the 
similarity of the results of the LIML and 2SLS methods, and the better performance of 
largely the same instruments used in both estimations, suggests that the 2SLS weak 
instrument diagnostics may have performed poorly. Indeed, it is puzzling why the 
instruments were found not to be sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variables in 
the first instance given that they comprise lagged values of these same variables, and that 
these are the standard instruments used routinely elsewhere in the literature. 
 
Different Directors 
We now complement our estimates for the whole period with two separate estimates for the 
tenures of different directors of the Riksbank. The current director Stefan Ingves has held 
the post since 2006 and he was preceded for a brief period by Lars Heikensten from 2003-5 
and by Urban Bäckström who presided from 1994 to 2002. We can therefore receive an 
indication of if, or how, concern for each of the variables in our equation has changed under 
the leadership of the different directors. We of course lose statistical power and instrument 
problems will be amplified because of the reduction in observations for each period, but the 
exercise is nevertheless interesting, and its results are displayed in table 5.5. 
As we can see, we do not to obtain a strong or significant coefficient for asset prices for any 
of the directors. For the Bäckström and Heikensten years we fail to attain a strongly 
positive or significant coefficient for inflation, which contradicts the Taylor rule. These 
results appear to fit with the empirical story, however, as from 1994 to 2005, inflation 
remained under target for the greater part of the period even when monetary policy was 
consistently expansionary and interest rates fell from previous highs (figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
Additionally, in the earlier part of the period the Riksbank was still engaged in a policy of 
disinflation, where high interest rates were prolonged even as inflation fell, in order to 
build credibility for the recently agreed upon inflation target GDP performed steadily as 
Sweden emerged from the 1990s crisis, and the Riksbank appears to have supported this 
expansion in the style of central banks generally during the Great Moderation years. 
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Indeed, the early 2000s have been characterised as a period when central banks in 
advanced economies did not follow the Taylor rule (e.g. Hofmann & Bogdanova 2012: 38, 
Taylor 2009: 2), and the Riksbank may fit this pattern, and this would also serve as an 
explanation as to why asset prices once again are not found to be significant. 
Meanwhile, Ingves’s directorship is characterised by a statistically meaningful response to 
forecasted inflation and a significant coefficient of similar size to out other estimates is 
obtained. This is again borne out by the empirical evidence as Ingves has faced inflationary  
 
Table 5.5: Estimates for Different Directorships of the Riksbank 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
 
  
 
Bäckström, 
Heikensten 
(1994-2005) 
 
 
Ingves 
(2006- present) 
 
       inflation gap 
  
0.05  
[0.541] 
 
0.20*  
[0.024] 
 
       output gap 
  
–0.27  
[0.136] 
 
0.03  
[0.758] 
 
       asset prices 
 
 
 
0.013 
[0.101] 
 
–0.001 
[0.885] 
 
       house prices 
  
0.002 
[0.958] 
 
–0.06 
[0.289] 
 
       SEK/EUR 
  
–0.01  
[0.461] 
 
–0.003  
[0.833] 
 
        
  
0.74**  
[0.001] 
 
0.51**  
[0.008] 
 
T 
  
44 
 
33 
 
   
 
  
0.50 
 
0.67 
    
(i) p-values are given in parentheses 
(ii) * Indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
(iii) ** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
(iv) Instruments:         
 ,       
   
,           ,       ,        ,        ,        
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headwinds twice during his tenure, once before the late 2000s financial crisis and again 
during Sweden’s seemingly swift recovery from the ensuing recession (figure 5.3). Hence, 
the response to inflation is attributable to the countercyclical policy which was intended to 
ward off inflationary pressures which were judged to be arising out of Sweden’s initially 
rapid recovery. Importantly, however, the asset price coefficients remain insignificant. This 
implies that the interest rate increases taking place during this period, for example in 2010, 
which have been criticised as leaning too heavily “against the wind” with apparent concerns 
about asset prices as the primary reason, instead have been motivated by forecasts about 
inflation. This is something which is again supported by statements by members of the 
Riksbank’s executive board who have said that rate hikes in the early 2010s were 
motivated by traditional monetary policy concerns about forecasted inflation, forecasts 
whose content was widely echoed by prognoses from other private and public institutions 
(Jansson 2014b: 3, 5-6). A final additional comment is that monetary policy under the 
Ingves directorship is found to be less inertial and a lower value for the smoothing 
parameter is obtained. This likely has to do with the relatively quick reversals in the 
direction of interest rate policy which have taken place during his tenure. 
Figure 5.1: Reporänta for Sweden 1995-2005  
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Figure 5.2: Output and Inflation Gaps for Sweden 1995-2005  
 
Figure 5.3: Reporänta for Sweden 2006-2014  
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Figure 5.4: Output and Inflation Gaps for Sweden 2006-2014  
 
 
Implications 
We do not find evidence that the Riksbank has been reacting to the deviation of asset prices 
from trend levels by altering the interest rate for any of our regressions. In the only 
regression where house prices are significant, it is in fact in the opposite direction implying 
that interest rates have been cut despite real estate prices deviating positively from 
“normal” levels. Our results thus lead to a rejection of the notion that the Riksbank’s 
policies of, for example, raising interest rates in 2010-11 rest on concerns about asset prices 
and not forecasts about target inflation. This allows us to conclude that the Riksbank has 
been behaving in a manner consistent with that outlined by Bernanke & Gertler (1999), 
whereby asset prices may indeed play a role in the deliberations of monetary policymakers, 
but primarily in so far as these give suggestions about the future course of inflation. It does 
not appear that the Riksbank has followed the recommendations of Checchetti et al. (2002), 
in spite of communication by members of the Riksbank sometimes being interpreted to the 
contrary. This suggests that the criticisms by Giavazzi & Mishkin (2006) leveled at the 
bank’s communication strategies regarding how its policies relate to asset prices may still 
be valid. 
That we draw these conclusions has important implications for financial stability in 
Sweden. We can see from our results that the variable of overriding significance for the 
setting of short term interest rates has been forecasted inflation, something which places 
the Riksbank’s behaviour much more in the context of the prescriptions of Tinbergen’s rule 
of one policy tool, one goal, as opposed to taking on too many other responsibilities at once. 
With inflation now at zero in Sweden, a long way from its target, a Riksbank behaving in 
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accordance with our conclusions will be very unlikely to suddenly take significant action 
through interest rate hikes to reduce dangers arising from potential real estate or stock 
market bubbles. Indeed, current communication from the Riksbank at face value confirms 
this, and the bank has declared itself ready to engage in further expansion to bring up the 
inflation rate, and sizeable rate hikes are probably not near at hand.  
We note also that monetary policy in Sweden confirms the notion of interest rate smoothing 
and that this practice is, along with inflation, an important determinant of the interest 
rate. This also applies to the Ingves directorship, even if its monetary policy has been less 
inertial than in previous years. In light of this, it would take an unreasonably large swing 
in the Riksbank’s behaviour for the path of interest rates to be reversed rapidly. In fact, by 
adhering to gradual and incremental movements in the interest rate, the Riksbank 
effectively rules itself out of the running to carry out adjustments in the interest rate in a 
large and unpredictable fashion in an attempt to dampen developments in asset markets. 
In addition, we know from the economic theory previously discussed that without 
smoothing financial stability can be undermined. So, even if smoothing were to be 
abandoned, this would probably conflict with the Riksbank’s mandated goal of maintaining 
a stable and efficient payments system. 
At the same time, the significant potential macroeconomic risks of inflated stock prices and 
house prices in Sweden remain. To make matters worse, these are being exacerbated by the 
structural factors earlier mentioned, particularly in real estate where housing supply is at a 
fraction of efficient levels while the possibility for households to benefit from interest rate 
deductions encourages higher borrowing. Additionally, with interest rates at record lows 
and likely to remain there for the foreseeable future, the room for maneuver for the 
Riksbank to conduct conventional monetary stimulus is minimal in the event that a 
housing bubble does burst and unleashes negative effects on the real economy.  
Unfortunately given the circumstances, important macroprudential reforms have thus far 
either been delayed (the mortgage requirement), or basically ruled out by unwilling 
politicians (the abolition of interest rate reductions). This is far from an encouraging sign. 
The prevailing monetary stance and the conclusions drawn here about the Riksbank’s 
behaviour mean that it is incumbent upon other institutions, like Finansinspektionen and 
the Swedish government, to make up for the macroprudential deficit Sweden currently 
faces. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has investigated whether or not the Riksbank has been reacting to deviations of 
asset prices from trend levels when setting the short-term interest rate. Having surveyed 
debates about the Riksbank’s performance, as well as the economic theory regarding how 
central banks should act, we then presented a modified Taylor rule incorporating forward 
looking central bank behavior, asset prices and interest rate smoothing. From the 
regression results we concluded that deviations of asset prices from trend levels have not 
induced a reaction by the Riksbank in the form of increases in interest rates. Instead the 
Riksbank has reacted to forecasts about inflation, and has set interest rates in a way 
characteristic of interest rate smoothing. In light of this, we do not find support for the 
claim that the Riksbank has disregarded its inflation targeting mandate in order to lean 
against the wind out of concern for asset prices. That the Riksbank has primarily focused 
on inflation and adjusting the reporänta only gradually has important policy implications. 
Based on its historical behaviour, and with inflation at zero and interest rates negative, the 
Riksbank should not be expected to undertake sizeable policy reversals in order to check 
asset price inflation. With this in mind, other institutions must take greater responsibility 
for carrying out macroprudential policy in Sweden, and instruments other than monetary 
policy should be used to rein in overheating in housing and asset prices, and to contain the 
threat posed by the potential build-up of financial imbalances. 
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